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Rowlands: Riverine Warfare

RIVERINE WARFARE
Exploiting a Vital Maneuver Space
Kevin Rowlands

There was usually too much water for the soldiers, but not enough for
the sailors.

D

VICE ADMIRAL WILFRED NUNN, 1932

espite a long history, riverine operations have received only scant attention
from the academic community and military analysts. The little writing that
exists on the topic tends to be either personal memoir or tactical instruction, with
serious analyses few and far between, and then often hidden away in more-general
texts on amphibious warfare. This article sets out to explore this unfamiliar yet
vital territory to determine the relevance of riverine operations to contemporary
and future military campaigns. It is pertinent now, as budget allocations once
again are reviewed and NATO’s amphibious doctrine is refreshed.
The article approaches the subject in three parts, each building toward an understanding of riverine operations in the modern context. First, the nature of the
riverine environment itself is discussed, using a classical geopolitical approach to
explain where the world’s major riverine areas are and why they are important in
security terms. Second, a historical review of military operations in the riverine
environment is presented, using case studies that range from the earliest recorded
naval battle, in the thirteenth century BCE, to the present day. The case studies
highlight numerous applications of military power, and consequently they help
to build a general understanding of what riverine
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A final section offers some conclusions. In particular, riverine environments
have the potential to become a critical maneuver space in the twenty-first century. Global strategic trends, from globalization to population migration and
urbanization, place these riverine systems at the forefront of likely zones of conflict. Therefore it is simply prudent militarily to possess the ability to operate and
maneuver effectively in such areas.
UNDERSTANDING THE RIVERINE ENVIRONMENT:
THE GEOPOLITICAL REALITY
To understand the importance of the riverine environment, one first must understand the river’s place within the global context. Geopolitics had its genesis
as a serious discipline in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and
among its first and most important writers—although he did not use the term
geopolitics himself—was Sir Halford Mackinder. Mackinder presented an analysis of the world very different from the views prevalent at the time. He made
continent-wide sweeping generalizations, and in doing so emphasized the “physical control, rather than the causes of universal history” in his conceptual thinking.1 In 1904, he published a seminal paper entitled “The Geographical Pivot of
History,” in which he argued that the world had become a closed political system
and that taking a broad, global view was necessary to understand it. In the political geography of the time, the key area, which Mackinder called the “heartland” or
“pivot,” was thought to be the sparsely populated center of the Eurasian landmass,
around which were the marginal coastal states and islands, which he placed in an
“Inner Crescent” and an “Outer Crescent.” To Mackinder, the heartland was the
region of strategic importance, and he is remembered best for his later statement
that “[w]ho rules the heartland commands the World Island; who rules the World
Island commands the World.”2
Alfred Thayer Mahan, the great American naval strategist and historian who
wrote at around the same time as Mackinder, also can be considered a geopolitical commentator. Contrary to Mackinder’s hypothesis, a central strand of
Mahan’s work was that not territorial control but access to and control of strategically important areas was the ultimate requirement for national growth. To
Mahan, the heartland was less critical than the coastal areas on its periphery.3
This grand, global analysis was developed further by later scholars of realist
geopolitics such as Nicholas Spykman, who coined the term rimland for those
areas on the maritime fringes. In common with Mahan, Spykman considered
these areas to be the most significant geopolitically because they contained the
greatest concentration of human and physical resources and lay at the junction
of the continental and maritime worlds. As such, they were the key to the balance
of world power.4 Therein lay their security problem: they had to “fend off threats
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss1/5
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FIGURE 1
MACKINDER’S “SEATS OF POWER” MAP

Source: First published in 1904 and reproduced in Mackinder, “The Geographical Pivot of History,” p. 38.

Figure 1: Mackinder’s “Seats of Power” map

from both land and sea.”5 The figure below shows Spykman’s map of the primary
rimland, which he also termed the Eurasian conflict zone. Interestingly, this confirst identified
1940s,Dalby,
is striking
in its similarity
History,” inflict
The zone,
Geopolitics
Reader, ed.inÓthe
Tuathail,
and Routledge,
p. 38. to Mackinder’s
inner or marginal crescent. Contemporary readers will not be surprised to find
that it is almost identical to the new “arc of instability” to which U.S. Secretary
of Defense James Mattis referred in a speech to the Munich Security Conference
in February 2017.6
The relevance of grand geopolitical theory in the context of this article, of
course, is that this contested rimland, this arc of instability, the strategic and
tactical focus for Western defense planners, is also the home of the world’s great
riverine systems. It was out of the alluvial basins of four great rivers—the TigrisEuphrates in Mesopotamia, the Nile in Egypt, the Indus in the subcontinent, and
the Yellow River in China—that the great civilizations arose.7
For much of human history, rivers provided the only means of transport for
exploration and commercial exploitation of land; the colonization of Africa in the
nineteenth century, for example, would not have been possible without navigable
rivers. The British expanded their empire in the west via the Niger and Gambia
Rivers, and the Belgians used the Congo to bring European control to much of
central Africa.8 As the colonial powers spread their influence around the world,
rivers commonly were used as boundaries, often because they were the only
geographical features marked on maps. Today, approximately 30 percent of the
Source: First published in 1904 and reproduced in Mackinder, “The Geographical Pivot of
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FIGURE 2
SPYKMAN’S “RIMLAND” MAP

Source: Spykman, The Geography of the Peace, pp. 51–52.

world’s 158,554 miles of land borders are made up of waterways—and these can
be the cause of dispute.9
It would be wrong to assume that the importance of rivers as a means of
communication has lessened in the twenty-first century. The Amazon remains
navigable by oceangoing ships for 2,300 miles, the Chang (Yangtze) for 620 miles,
and the Saint Lawrence for 1,300 miles, and all are vital to the flow of trade.10
And clearly, not all riverine trade is legitimate; for example, it was estimated just
over a decade ago that rivers carried over 80 percent of drug-related traffic in
Colombia.11
The water from rivers provides a vital life support for the populations living
near them. Millions of square miles of land globally are permanently irrigated by
river waters; much of this expanse is in the densely populated regions of East and
Southeast Asia.12 Rivers also provide the source for much energy generation; hydroelectric power plants currently supply 13 percent of the total annual electricity
needs of the United States.13 However, this degree of successful exploitation is not
universal, and significant potential exists in the untapped resources of central and
southern Asia, Africa, and South America. The extensive use of rivers and riverine areas has led to very significant environmental degradation in some cases,
and the potential for more. Commercial navigation and dredging have affected
rates of erosion and have impacted agriculture; pollution has resulted in severe
risks to health; and the industrial use of rivers, from the taking of cooling water to
the discharge of effluent, has led to changes in ecosystems that affect the ecologies
and food chains of entire regions.
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The geopolitical reality is that the riverine environments of the world tend
to be the areas that are susceptible to the greatest shock in security terms. They
are very highly populated; they rely heavily on the river waters for agriculture,
industry, power, and transport; and they are both potential sources and victims of
severe environmental impacts, with the accompanying risks to individual human
health and societal sustainability. They also are located in strategically relevant
areas—areas in which the international community has an interest in maintaining stability.
OPERATIONS IN THE RIVERINE ENVIRONMENT—
THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT
In the preindustrial age, when the world was in large part subject to the dominion
of empires, wars tended to be fought for control of territory. Navies extended the
influence of their political masters to places inaccessible by other means, and in
so doing they long have fought on inland waters. Probably the first recorded naval
battle in history was that between the Egyptians and the invading “Sea Peoples” in
the thirteenth century bce. The invaders used various routes into Egypt, including an attack through the tributaries in the Nile delta, but were defeated on the
rivers and on land by the defending Egyptian forces.14 The two sides came faceto-face on the waters of the Nile and engaged in battle; in today’s phraseology, this
early example of riverine warfare between two opposing armies can be classified
as a major combat operation.
In the American War of Independence (1775–83), extensive riverine operations took place.15 In 1775, American forces conducted river patrols around Lake
Champlain in the New England–Canada border region and gained control of the
waterways, preventing British forces from maneuvering in an area without roads.
The Americans then used the waterways as a means of transportation for land
forces in the invasion of Canada; the multiple axes of advance bested the British
defenses, Montreal was taken, and the Continental forces under the command
of Benedict Arnold reached as far as Quebec.16 Area control was exercised and,
logistically, the use of the riverine environment for troop transportation was
entirely successful.
The operational movement of armies by river was a significant feature in the
American Civil War (1861–65) as well. General Ulysses S. Grant used established
river networks to place his army of 18,000 men close to Petersburg in 1864,
gaining a “tremendous advantage” over General Robert E. Lee’s opposing forces.
Both Union and Confederate forces deployed significant numbers of ships and
boats on the rivers and deltas of the states, including well over a hundred vessels,
some of them ironclads, on the Mississippi alone.17 The city of New Orleans fell
to Union naval forces attacking from the river and, for the first time in riverine
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2018
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FIGURE 3
AN IRONCLAD ON THE MISSISSIPPI RIVER DURING THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR

Source: “USS St. Louis in 1862,” Steamboat Times, steamboattimes.com/.

warfare, the Confederate navy put significant emphasis on denying its enemy the
use of the riverine environment by irregular means, including mining and the
use of barrages and other obstructions.18 Ultimately, however, Union riverine
forces gained the upper hand and achieved control of the major waterways—with
long-lasting strategic effect. Their control of the Mississippi effectively cut the
Confederacy in two and severed its vital supply lines from the West and South.19
The American Civil War showed the utility of riverine forces in major combat
operations, troop transportation, the denial of enemy maneuver space, and the
disruption of supplies.
British riverine operations followed a similar pattern in the latter part of the
nineteenth century. A Royal Navy flotilla accompanied Lord Kitchener on his
expedition up the Nile during the 1898 reconquest of the Sudan after the Mahdist
Revolt, performing a number of functions in support of the land forces. The flotilla was used first in a logistical capacity, transporting men, weaponry, and provisions from Egypt, and then very effectively as field artillery, bombarding dervish
positions near the river.20 Because of its asymmetry and relatively low-intensity
nature, the Mahdist Revolt cannot be classified as a major combat operation.
However, it is perhaps indicative of a shift along the spectrum of conflict toward
counterinsurgency, as the preindustrial age merged into the industrial.
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Riverine operations did not feature to a significant degree in the primary theaters of World Wars I and II, the two major interstate conflicts of the industrial
age. There could be a number of reasons for this, not least the descent into trench
warfare during the 1914–18 conflict in Europe and the greater use of improved
motorized vehicles for transport in 1939–45. In addition, in the major combat
operations of the industrial age, air superiority was essential; in general, riverine
operations took place only in areas in which air superiority had been won or, at
least, where it was denied to the enemy. The trend, therefore, was for operations
on rivers to be increasingly on the periphery of conflicts, in terms of both geography and intensity.
However, there are good examples of riverine operations taking place during
and between the world wars, and Vice Admiral Wilfred Nunn gave an excellent
personal account of the British action against Ottoman forces in Mesopotamia
during the First World War in his memoir Tigris Gunboats.21 Although geographically disconnected from the main battleground of Europe, the war in the Middle
East was of strategic importance to all sides, with “Turkey, Iraq and Britain . . .
[in] . . . a battle for the control and ultimate utilization of not only the waters of
the [Tigris and Euphrates] rivers but . . . for virtually all the natural resources of
the region.”22
The complex theater of the Middle East was one in which major interstate war,
colonial liberation movements, and the protection of key economic infrastructure were conducted side by side; in effect, the war in Iraq oscillated between
major combat and a series of running skirmishes. Nunn explains how oceangoing warships, redirected from India, operated in the rivers of Iraq during the
Mesopotamia campaign. They were used in a variety of tasks, from the insertion
of advanced forces for covert operations, such as cutting Turkish communication
lines, to the landing of the main British expeditionary force in 1914, and subsequent patrols along the main thoroughfare of the desert.23 Analysis of Nunn’s
account shows riverine operations used for prelanding and amphibious assault
operations, support to land forces, and assistance to the anti-Ottoman insurgency
conducted by the indigenous Arab populace.
Although riverine operations did not become divorced completely from major combat operations, they clearly were trending from higher to lower intensity
along the spectrum of warfare. One important aspect of Nunn’s book is the emphasis he gives to the necessity for close cooperation between land and maritime
elements operating in a riverine environment.24
As predicted by the geopolitical overview outlined earlier, many of the armed
independence movements that arose in the aftermath of the Second World
War took place in the rimland, the regions of the world with extensive riverine
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environments, none more so than Southeast Asia. During the decade of the
Malayan Emergency (1948–58), naval operations deep into the jungle by river
provided both fire support to and transport for members of the predominantly
land security forces and were of considerable importance in this classic counterinsurgency campaign.25
Similarly, during the Indonesian “Confrontation” (1962–66) rivers often
provided the only means of access through difficult terrain. Riverine operations there ranged from routine logistical resupply to opposed amphibious raids
against rebel groupings and “hearts and minds” patrols to demonstrate the presence of the legitimate authority in difficult-to-reach areas.26 In both Malaya and
Indonesia there was little or no direct threat from the air, and the operations the
riverine forces conducted formed an integral part of what became British counterinsurgency tactics.
Perhaps the zenith of industrial-age riverine operations came in the French
and American campaigns in Vietnam from the late 1940s until the mid-1970s; it
was certainly the period that produced the greatest volume of written accounts.
The commentators, be they servicemen who experienced the operations themselves or academics analyzing the period, tell essentially the same story. Japanese,
French, Vietnamese, and American activity on the waterways of Southeast Asia
FIGURE 4
USN CRAFT IN OPERATION GAME WARDEN, CA. 1968

Source: “Game Warden Support,” USS Duncan Reunion Association, www.ussduncan.org/.

Figure 4: USN Craft in Operation {SC} Game Warden, ca.1968
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss1/5

Source: “Game Warden Support,” USS Duncan Reunion Association, www.ussduncan.org/.
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was fundamentally the same, differing only in scale according to the requirements of the time.27 Perhaps the role that riverine forces performed is explained
best by the varied types of vessel employed: patrol boats, assault craft, troop carriers, flamethrowers, minesweepers, and command-and-control units.28
The necessity for riverine operations in Vietnam becomes clear when its geography is considered. The Mekong Delta took up one-fifth of South Vietnam’s area,
and there were few roads but over 2,500 miles of man-made canals and natural
waterways.29 Writing in 1973, Major General William B. Fulton, USA, stated that
it was “not possible for a land force to operate in the Mekong Delta in 1965 without some means of maneuver on water.”30
Fulton, who was instrumental in the establishment of the U.S. riverine force
in the mid-1960s, explains that the initial concept was to use its craft as a mobile
base for troops, capable of maintaining a brigade-sized formation in the delta
for up to six months.31 He goes on to describe some of the wider utility of such a
joint capability: “This Army and Navy force of approximately 5,000 men capable
of combat and containing within itself combat service support could be moved
from 100 to 200 km in a 24-hour period and could then launch a day or night operation within 30 minutes after anchoring; its true potential is apparent.”32 Fulton
gives numerous examples of the effectiveness of a low-footprint force, from fire
support to strike operations against enemy bases that “in some instances had not
been penetrated for two or three years.”33
However, others have argued that the true potential of the riverine force in
Vietnam was not in its offensive capability but in its ability to prevent Vietcong
supply operations. The coastal patrols of Operation MARKET TIME, by the U.S.
Coast Guard and Navy, and the river patrols of Operation GAME WARDEN in
the late 1960s were not mounted merely to clear the delta of enemies but to deny
them use of it.34 This distinction between destroying an enemy and curtailing its
activities points to a niche role that riverine operations can fulfill in the wider
prosecution of a campaign.
After the Tet Offensive in 1968, GAME WARDEN and MARKET TIME were
amalgamated and became the Southeast Asia Lake, Ocean, River, and Delta Strategy, known as SEALORDS. The emergence of a tactical doctrine of interdiction,
pacification, and area clearance through limited offensive action started in the
early days of the Vietnam engagement and its evolution continued through the
later stages of the war and, by default, into the postindustrial era to today.
Despite the importance of the joint action in the Mekong Delta to the overall campaign, little effort went into analyzing the lessons of Vietnam riverine
operations and formulating them for application to future conflicts.35 The
capability that had been built up in time of need largely atrophied during the
final fifteen years of the Cold War. However, a period of increased international
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2018
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interventionism and a surge in peacekeeping operations following the demise of
the Soviet Union led to a renewal of interest in the riverine environment in the
early 1990s. To some, the peacekeeping experience was an indication of the likely
shape of future conflict, and the subsequent bias of attention meant that certain
capabilities were “rebranded” to fit the new requirement. James D. Kiras, for
instance, was one of a very few writers in the immediate post–Cold War period
to undertake a review of the American riverine experiences in Vietnam, but he
did so to draw lessons from the “wealth of tactical and operational experience” to
show that the riverine capability could be applied to peacekeeping.36
A good example of the early post–Cold War peacekeeping effort, and one
that involved a significant riverine contribution, was the UN Advance Mission
in Cambodia, 1991–92, and UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC),
1992–93. UNTAC was born out of the Paris Peace Accords of 1991–92 and aimed
to bring order to Cambodia after years of civil war.37 One part of the military effort was the water-based patrolling of the coast and rivers, which involved fifteen
coastal vessels, eleven landing craft, and over fifty small boats.38
Kiras states that “those navies which maintain substantial riverine forces are,
not surprisingly, those with internal security problems and major waterways.”39
Clearly, internal security problems can take many forms, and a different application of riverine operations has been seen in Colombia’s counternarcotic and
counterinsurgency campaigns. Developed since the 1950s, Colombia’s riverine
force has grown to be the largest in the world. It was designed to combat both the
drug cartels operating in the country and the insurgent Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia, known as FARC.40 The Colombian marines built a doctrine
based on the core roles of riverine assault, surveillance, interdiction, and support,
which has provided a high degree of success in their long-term efforts.41 The Colombian model, founded on the lessons of others, has developed into an example
of best practice for nations looking to grow such a capability. However, Kiras’s
assertion that riverine forces are built by those with internal security problems
is due a reassessment. Postindustrial, post–Cold War focused intervention by
the Western democracies, particularly the United States, has altered the shape of
contemporary conflict, and there is ample evidence that riverine capabilities now
are employed more broadly, as a study of Iraq shows.
The experiences of the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq from 2003 until 2010 were
the catalyst for another renewal of interest in riverine operations.42 Major combat
operations commenced in March 2003 but lasted just a few weeks, until the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s regime; thereafter the occupation of the country was
met with sporadic cycles of relative peace, resistance, criminality, insurgency, and
terrorism. The military mission in the country quickly became one of stabilization, with subsidiary operations across virtually the whole spectrum of conflict.
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss1/5
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From the outset riverine forces were required; when hostilities commenced,
the U.K. Royal Marines were involved intimately in the initial assault on the alFaw peninsula and the subsequent patrols of the riverine environment in southern Iraq. They conducted thirty-one days of continuous boat operations over
ninety miles of inland waterways, accomplished three opposed landings, and
fired in excess of ten thousand rounds of ammunition.43 The extensive marshlands in southeastern Iraq had to be cleared of enemy combatants while the main
ground forces progressed north through the country. Inshore raiding craft and
hovercraft were used to good effect, providing means of maneuver in an environment unsuitable for road vehicles and over which the safety of helicopters could
not be guaranteed.44
Early stabilization tasking for the riverine forces after the initial combat phase
ended focused on countering burgeoning criminality. A clear picture of activities on the river was built through patrol, reconnaissance, and engagement with
local traders, with the result that river traffic suspected of smuggling contraband
could be stopped and boarded; the mission lent effective support to the legitimate
economy of the region.45 Other countertrafficking operations took place farther
inland, in the Maysan province in eastern Iraq. Riverine forces were the only
coalition contingent able to operate in the reeds and marshes of the province,
which was used as a major supply route for munitions and insurgents crossing
the border from Iran.46
In the north of Iraq, the U.S. Marine Corps Small Craft Company (SCCO) provided the initial riverine capability after the invasion. Again operating primarily
on the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, the SCCO’s role increasingly became one of
counterinsurgency, but the force’s limited numbers meant that its personnel were
spread thinly throughout the country, and their opponents exploited the gaps.
In 2004, U.S. forces attempted to retake the cities of Samarra’ and Fallujah, but,
as one American officer explained at the time, the insurgents effectively were
operating at will on the waterways. “The rivers are enemy territory and still uncontested. . . . Several different intelligence summaries indicated that the enemy
forces were using the river as a primary avenue of reinforcement, resupply and
egress.”47
The U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps were able to set up traffic-control
points to interdict insurgent movement on the roads and highways, but they had
no capability for routine interdiction on the water. The Army’s First Infantry
Division tried to procure riverine craft, specifically to employ in its sector north
of Baghdad.48 However, as General Mattis, the commander of the First Marine
Division during the battle for Fallujah, stated, “The enemy has exploited the lack
of U.S. dominance in inland waterway warfare.”49
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The capability shortfall in the U.S. armory was acknowledged and addressed
through the creation of a dedicated USN riverine group, consisting of three
squadrons, as part of the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command. The naval
squadrons took over for the stretched SCCO in 2007. 50 The Expeditionary
Combat Command listed the tasks that its riverine units were expected to fulfill,
ranging from support to a landing force in an opposed amphibious assault at one
end of the spectrum, to security assistance, interdiction, and casualty evacuation
at the other.51 However, the riverine groups were rebranded as coastal riverine
groups in 2012, with one located on each coast of the United States, but with only
one riverine company per squadron.52
HISTORICAL TRENDS IN RIVERINE OPERATIONS
The vignettes above show that during the preindustrial age riverine operations
primarily were a feature of major war fighting, and that river forces were used
for four broad purposes: engagement of opposing maritime forces in battle,
FIGURE 5
RIVERINE OPERATIONS ALONG THE SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT

TRADITIONAL WAR

Intensity

Major Combat
Operations

STABILIZATION

Counterinsurgency

Security
Assistance

Time

Iraq

Colombia

Postindustrial
Cambodia

Vietnam

Malaya/Indonesia

Mesopotamia

Industrial
Sudan

American Civil War

American War of Independence

Ancient Egypt

Preindustrial

Source: The categorization of the intensity of the conflict (the y axis) is adapted from the spectrum of war as described in Benbow et al., Renewal of Navy’s
Riverine Capability, p. 65. The division of conflict into traditional war and stabilization is the author’s own.
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engagement of opposing land forces in battle from the waterways, own-forces
transportation, and denial of the enemy’s transportation.
As tactics developed in the industrial age, the intensity of action necessarily drove riverine operations from the main theaters of interstate war, and their
employment became centered on counterinsurgency and support to land forces
where little or no air threat was present. Counterinsurgency remained a theme
into the postindustrial era, but the riverine environment also has seen increasing
security-assistance efforts aimed at peacekeeping and anticriminality measures.
Although not perfectly linear, there has been a definite progression along the
spectrum of conflict from traditional war fighting and major combat operations
toward what is now called stabilization. The diagram in figure 5 illustrates this
trend in graphical form. It does not situate each campaign exactly; rather, it attempts to show where the scope of each riverine operation sits along the spectrum of war. As such, it is a subjective assessment, but one generally supported
by a historical analysis of riverine operations.
CONTEMPORARY RELEVANCE
As the examples provided show, the operations in which riverine forces have been
involved display common, enduring characteristics, such as control of waterways,
interdiction, transportation, logistics support, and presence in difficult-to-reach
areas. Each of these types of operation requires similar and transferable skill sets,
and each of these skill sets is useful across the spectrum of operations, from major combat to stabilization and peace support. There is therefore high potential
for the broad use of riverine forces in the future, particularly in Mattis’s “arc of
instability,” with the Gulf of Guinea and parts of South America as additional hot
spots in which they could operate.53 An inability to maneuver effectively in these
geographical spaces would render them no-go areas for intervention.
Activities need not require the use of force, however, and humanitarian assistance / disaster relief operations, such as facilitating the delivery of food and
water to a distressed population, may be an immediate priority that civilian
agencies are, for whatever reason, unable to meet. For instance, when Hurricane
Katrina hit the U.S. Gulf Coast in 2005 it wreaked havoc across a wide area, flooding roads and making low-lying ground inaccessible. In an operation involving
5,600 Coast Guardsmen, the U.S. Coast Guard provided an immediate response
that saved over thirty thousand people.54 Within hours the U.S. Navy’s Special
Warfare Special Boat Team 22, based in Mississippi, was activated and was able to
conduct search-and-rescue missions to deliver essential aid to stranded people.55
Other governmental and nongovernmental organizations were to follow, but the
immediate response to the emergency fell to the armed forces.
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In a very different context but equally vitally, Bangladesh formed a riverine
force in 2015 to protect UN barges delivering aid to beleaguered South Sudan on
the river Nile—there was no other way to get through.56 In security sector reform,
riverine forces can engage in countercriminality work, assisting in ensuring the
proper conduct of elections, as they did in Cambodia, and helping to train and
mentor indigenous security forces, as the coalition naval advisory training teams
did in Iraq. The development of the local economic infrastructure in a region of
instability is primarily a civilian undertaking, but, as with all military deployments, there are circumstances in which riverine forces have a role to play. This
might be in a direct manner, such as the management of harbors and waterways,
or indirectly, by creating the stable conditions in which enterprise and growth
can flourish.
Military operations for the Western powers over the last two decades unquestionably have been land-centric and, as Colin S. Gray warned with his concept
of the “sin of presentism,” it is all too easy to assume—and all too easy to get
wrong—that the future will look much like today. However, “if maps of population spread and conflict are laid upon each other, it is evident that the littoral,
estuaries, rivers, and lakes are vital arteries of life and thus foci of conflict.”57 If
this geopolitical assertion is accepted, then it is logical to conclude that the possession of an ability to operate and deliver effect in these environments is merely
a practical expression of prudent military judgment.
The strategic importance of the world’s littoral areas is fast becoming accepted
wisdom. The similarity among Mackinder’s marginal crescents, Mahan’s coastal
periphery, Spykman’s rimland, and the contemporary arcs of “crisis,” “concern,”
or “instability” is striking. Even a cursory glance at an atlas shows that the major
river systems sit in the marginal regions between the continental and maritime
worlds and are, and historically always have been, centers of population, commerce, and transportation, as well as boundaries between states and cultures.
They also are a prime breeding ground for those sources of instability that the
interdependent core of the international community has to tackle in defense of its
own self-interest; human migration, environmental degradation, and economic
stagnation are just some examples of processes that can lead to failed states and
fragile regions.
There is clear evidence of naval warfare on rivers from the very earliest recorded battles to the present day. Examination of the nature of riverine operations through the ages makes it possible to identify several common denominators. In particular, the employment of riverine forces has been largely consistent,
whether in war, counterinsurgency, or security assistance. Their utility has
been demonstrated time and again in the areas of transportation, especially in
difficult-to-reach areas; logistical support to land forces; and the denial of vital
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss1/5
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maneuver space to an enemy. Although there is not a perfectly linear progression,
there has been a definite trend toward riverine operations being conducted at
the lower-intensity end of the conflict spectrum. Historically, riverine operations
have a distinguished pedigree, and there is no evidence to suggest this has come
to an end.
However, although navies long have undertaken riverine operations, the
maintenance of such a capability on inland waterways has been inconsistent and
episodic, especially during the era of industrial warfare. In most cases, riverine
operations have been mounted on an ad hoc basis and the capability has been disestablished on completion.58 Choosing to break this cycle by maintaining a base
level of capability available to be employed whenever required is clearly a policy
decision, and one dependent on numerous factors, not least perceptions of threat,
the level of existing commitments, and the availability of resources.
The principal conclusion therefore must be that riverine operations have a
fundamental relevance to contemporary and future campaigns. They may not
be the only maritime contribution, but they have the potential to provide very
significant contributions to military involvement—in particular, stabilization
and development. Some countries, such as the United States, have invested in
the maintenance of a rudimentary riverine capability, clearly seeing the riverine
environment as a likely and critical maneuver space in the future. Those other
Western, liberal democracies that actively continue to pursue interventionist
foreign and defense policies in the interdependent world would be prudent to
review the evidence and do likewise.
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